Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Mary M. Stroud v. Industrial Commission of Utah
et al : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Edward W. Clyde; Attorney for Petitioner;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stroud v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7687 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1502

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I~

7687.

~ ·===========================
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)[A:RY M._ S';rROUD,
Petitioner,
----c

vs.-

lliDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
;THE •STATE OF UTAH, and·

Case No.
7687

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORA-

·TION, a mnn.icipal corporation,
Defend.amts.

Brief of Petitioner

EDWARD W. CLYDE,
Attorney for Petitioner

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE. __________________________________________________ --------------------- 1
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR ________________________________________ ----------------------

2

THE FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------ARGUMENT

2

(1) The Workmen's Compensation Act Should Be Liberally
Construed in Favor of Compensation..........................................

4

(2) Under Utah Statutes Compensation Should Be Awarded
If Either (A) the Accident Arises Out of the Employment, or (B) in the Course of the Employment........................

5

(3) The Accident Involved Here Arose Out of the Employment..
(a) Cases in Which Courts Have Held That Gun Accidents Arise Out of the Employment....................................

6
9

(b) The Industrial Commission's Opinion.................................. 16
(c) It is Immaterial That the Gun Was Not Owned by
Salt Lake CitY-----····-----·-----------····--··-·····-·······-······---··-·············-- 17
(d) It is Immaterial That the Employer Did Not Order
Stroud to Carry the Gun ........................................................ 18
(4) Stroud Was in the Course of His Employment ........................ 18
SUMMARY -·--··············-·············-----·--···················--·--·-········----·---··-············· 21
CASES CITED
Beaver City v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 8, 245 P. 378 .......... 9, 17
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020..........

4

Comstock v. Bivens, (Col.) 78 Col. 107, 239 P. 869 .................... 13, 17,18
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161,
207 P. 148 ················---·------·······------·-·······-·--·--···----·············-----·--·-····-·- 6, 7
Dunphy v. Augustia College of Villanova, 195 Atl. 782 ...................... 20
Frank v. Point Marion Bridge Co., 128 Pa. Sup. 269, 193 Atl. 421.. .. 17
Gallaher v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (Texas) 77 S.W.
2d 312 ------------------·-----------··--------·--·-----··---··---··---··--··--·-··----·--·······--------14, 18
Goins v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, (La.) 200 So. 481.. .......................... 10
Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., (La.) 155 So. 63 .................... 11, 18
Mayor v. Ward, 114 S.W. 804............ -------·--·-······-------···---········-······-·--·----· 10
M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488,
189 P. 2d 132.... ---·········-····-----····----····------····----·······---·--·-···-·----4, 7, 16,20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
McDaniel v. City of Benson, 167 Minn. 407, 209 N.W. 26 .................. 13
Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission,
103 Utah 64, 133 P. 2d 314................................................................ 6, 8
Security State Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Col. 67, 59 P.
2d 798 ·---------------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------13, 17' 18
Smith v. University of Idaho, 170 P. 2d 404 ........................................ 20
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, (Ala.) 32 So. 2d 666 .................... 12
State Road Commission v. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 252 ...... 20
Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348........................................................................ 20
Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150 P. 2d 379.......... 6
Twin Peaks Canning Company v. Industrial Commission, 67
Utah 589, 196 P. 853----···············-----------························------------···------- 20
Utah Apex Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah
537, 248 P. 493........................................................................................ 7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F· THE STATE Q~F UTAH
~IARY ~I.

STROUD,
Petitioner,

-vs.INDUSTRIAL COMl\iiSSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, and

Case No.

7687

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a municipal corporation,
Defenda;nts.

Brief of Petitioner
NATURE OF THE CASE
The petitioner is the widow of Thomas William
Stroud, who was killed when his gun accidentally discharged. Mr. Stroud was employed by Salt Lake City
Corporation as a police officer. The petitioner applied
for compensation. After a contested hearing compensation was denied and the petitioner brings this review.
1
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SPECIFICATION OF ERROR
Petitioner contends that the Industrial Commission
erred:
In concluding that the accident which caused
Mr. Stroud's death did not arise out of his employment.
1.

2. In concluding that the accident did not occur in
the course of the employment.

THE FACTS
The facts brought out at the conte-sted hearing are
not in dispute. It is admitted that Thomas Stroud was
employed by Salt Lake City as a policeman (R. 6 and
7); that Salt Lake City was subject to the Workmen's
Compensation Act (R. 6); that Thomas Stroud was
killed by the discharge of his gun on January 5, 1951,
at about 6:00 p.m. (R. 6, 7, 11). It was agreed that the
only issue for determination was whether or not Stroud
was killed by accident which (a) arose out of his employment, or (b) occurred in the course of his employment. (R. 7).
Stroud was subject to call 24 hours per day. He
had an assigned shift which required him to work specific hours of each day and gave him one day off per
week (R. 8, 10, 13, 6). The day of the accident was his
usual day off (R. 13, 14, 33). He was a sergeant with
the duty of supervising the work of several policemen
(R. 14, 16, 17). On the previous day he had arranged
with two officers to come to the police station at 6:00
2
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p.m. the following day, at which time and place he was
to check out for them a special police car. (R. 14, 15, 17,
18). The car in question was one without any equipment
to identify it as a police car, and it had to be specially
checked out (R. 36). Both of these officers testified that
on Thursday Stroud requested them to meet him at the
station at 6:00 p.m., Friday, so that he could get the car
for them (R. 15, 17, 18, 28). Stroud also mentioned to
Officer Brinton that he was going to arrange for the car
(R. 36). There is no eYidence to the contrary. On Friday,
Officer Stroud arrived at the station just before 6:00
p.m. He was seen in street clothes at his desk a short
time before the accident, which happened at about 6 :00
p.m. (R. 29, 30).
The two officers who were to meet Officer Stroud
at the station at 6 :00 p.m. were sent to Fort Douglas
on special business and, therefore, did not arrive until
after the accident (R. 15, 16, 28). Officer Stroud did not
in fact check the car out for them (R. 19, 36). Officer
Stroud was killed when his gun fell while he was lifting
some cases of Coca-Cola from a patrol car into his own
private car. He intended to take the Coca-Cola to a
police benefit party (R. 11, 12, 13). The gun with which
he was killed was not the regular service revolver issued
by Salt Lake City, but was an automatic pistol owned
by him (R. 12, 14, 27). It was, however, the pistol which
he customarily carried (R. 10, 31).
The evidence was undisputed that Salt Lake City
police officers customarily carry a gun with them at all
times, whether they are on or off duty (R. 9, 10, 20, 23,
3
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25, 28). Such has been the custom for at least twenty
years (R. 26). One of the witnesses testified that as a
part of the indoctrination training for new policemen,
he was told by the instructors that he was to carry his
gun at all times (R. 22). Chief Crowther testified that
he was told when he first became connected with the
police department that he was expected to carry a gun
(R. 25). There is no rule in the police manual requiring
officers to carry guns.
Still the only conclusion which could possibly be
drawn from the evidence is that it was a uniform custom of police officers working for Salt Lake City to
carry guns while off duty (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 25, 28).

ARGUMENT
1. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN
FAVOR OF COMPENSATION.

In compensation cases the Utah Supreme Court has
uniformly held that all doubtful cases should be resolved
in favor of awarding compensation. See M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.
2nd 132, Charndler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah
213, 184 P. 1020.
In the M. & K. Corporation case, the court said:
''We have also repeatedly held that this statute should be liberally construed and if there is
any doubt respecting the right to compensation
it should be resolved in favor of a recovery."
(Citing many cases.)
4
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~.

rXDER UTAH STATUrrES COl\1Pl1~NSATION
SHOULD BE A\YAHDED IF EITHER (A) rrHE
ACCIDEXT ARISES OUT OF THE El\IPLOY:JlEXT, OR (B) IN THE COURSE OF rrriE El\1PLOY:JIEXT.

The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that
because of a 1919 amendment to what is now Section
-1::2-1-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, it is only necessary
to show either one of two things: (a) That the accident
arose out of the employment, or (b) That it occurred in
the course of his employment. Prior to 1919 the Section
used the word "and", but in 1919 the Legislature substituted the word "or" and since that date this court
has consistently held that only one or the other need be
shown. This is pointed out in numerous cases, one of
the more recent being M. & K. Corporation, supra, 112
rtah 488, in ·which the court says:
''Since the 1919 amendment to that section
(42-1-43) when the word 'or' which we have
italicized above was substituted for the word' and'
it is not necessary for the accident to arise both
out of and occur in the course of his employment,
it is sufficient if the accident only arises in the
course of his employment. Workmen's Compensation statutes both in this country and throughout the British Empire usually require, as did
ours before the amendment, that the accident
arise both out of and in the course of the employment, and this must be kept in mind in considering the decisions of other jurisdictions. We haYe
often pointed out this distinction and indicated
in many cases that the recovery was allowed on
that account and that it probably would not have
been allowed without the amendment.''
5
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There are numerous Utah cases to the same effect.
See Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150
P. 2nd 379; Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P. 2nd 314; Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207
P. 148, and other cases cited therein.
3. THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED HERE AROSE
OUT OF TIIE EMPLOYMENT.
We believe that a reading of the decision of the Industrial Commission will demonstrate that the Industrial Commission concerned itself primarily, if not exclusively, with the question of whether or not Stroud
was in the course of his employment when killed. It
concluded that he was not, because it was his day off,
and because the loading of soda water into his own car
was neAt a part of his employer's business. For the purpose of our argument under this point, let it be conceded
that Stroud was not in the course of his employment
when killed. The Utah Statutes, nevertheless, under the
cases cited in Point 2 hereof, allow recovery if the accident which resulted in Stroud's death "arose out of his
employment.''
We submit that except for the fact that Stroud
carried a gun, he would never have been killed. The
cases cited hereinafter will demonstrate that it is not
necessary for the employer to specifically require the
employee to carry a gun. All that is required is that the
carrying of a gun be reasonably related or incident to
the employment. If it is, and death results from an acci6
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dent with the gun, all of the cases hold that the accident
"arises out of the ernployme,ut."
There are literally hundreds of cases defining the
term "arising out of the employment". This court has
considered the phrase on numerous occasions. We will
not lengthen this brief with detailed definitions of that
term. The ca~es are uniform to the effect that the words
''arising out of'' are construed to refer to the origin or
cause of the injury, and involve the idea that the accident
is in some sense due to or caused by the employment,
and the words "in the course of" refer to the time,
place and cirrumstances under which it occurred. See
Ctah Apex Jlining Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission,
67 Utah 537, 248 P. 493; M. db K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, supra.
If the employment subjects the employee to risks
which are different from or greater than those to which
the public is subjected, and those dangers result in an
accidental injury, then the accident arises out of the
employment. For example, in the Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Industrial Commission case, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148,
the court held that an employee injured while going to
work was injured by accident arising out of the employment, because in going to work he was required to go
down a particular lane and cross a series of railroad
tracks to reach his employer's place of business. There
was no other way that the employee could get to his
work. By taking the only lane available to him, he was
subjected to the dangers incident to crossing railroad
tracks. rrhis court held that because his employment

7
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subjected him to that danger, his death, caused by collision with a train, arose out of his employment, even
though he had not yet arrived at work, and even though
it was before his working hours started.
In Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P. 2nd 314, the court permitted an employee who had left work and was on his
way home to recover workmen's compensation because
he was exposed to certain dangers in crossing the public
highway to get to a parking lot. The court cited the
Cudahy Packing Company case and emphasized the fact
that it was his employment which subjected him to the
particular risk. The court distinguished cases from
other jurisdictions which require, contrary to the Utah
law, that the accident also occur in the course of the
employment. The court said that the fact that the
d~nger was one to which the employee was subjected by
reason of his employment, demonstrated that the accident arising out of said danger arose out of the employment.
Officer Stroud was exposed to the dangers of a gun
accident by his employment. There certainly can be no
doubt under the evidence that he carried the gun because
of his employment as a police officer. (R. 9, 10, 20, 23,
25, 28). In fact, the carrying of the gun without a permit
would have been illegal except for the fact that he was
employed as a policeman. See Section 103-21-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943. All of the officers carried guns
on their days off and such practice was not only known
by the police department, but was encouraged by it. (R.

8
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9, 10, ~0, ~3. ~3, 28) Under tht> cases which are cited
hereafter, it is clear that this is sufficient to show that
the accident arose out of his employment.

There haYe been numerous cases in which employees
haYe been injured in gun accidents. The cases recognize
that persons who handle firearms are subjected to the
risk of being accidentally shot. If the possession of
firearms is reasonably related to or incident to the employment, then any accident resulting from use or possession of said firearms is held to arise out of the employment. If, however, the presence of a gun has no
relationship whatever to the employment, then even
though the accident occurs while the employee is actually
performing his master's services, (in course of employment) the accident does not "arise out of the employment.''

(a) Cases in Which Courts Have Held that Gun
Accidents Arise Out of the Employment.
The only Utah case dealing directly with this
point is Beaver City v. Industrial Commission, 67
"Utah 8, 245 P. 378. Here the Beaver City Marshall,
who was on call 24 hours per day dropped his gun
in the mud while chasing cattle out of a city park.
That evening he was cleaning the gun at his home
and was hurt when it accidentally discharged. There
was no evidence as to whose gun it was. The court
said, however, that this made no difference. The
court did not attempt to distinguish between '' arising out of" or "in the course of" the employment,
but said that because he was cleaning his gun he
was in the course of his employment and was entitled
to compensation. Because the Utah law permits recovery upon the showing of either one, the court
9
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did not go further and consider whether or not the
accident also arose out of the employment.
In the case of Mayor v. Ward, 114 S.W. 804, a
policeman was subject to call 24 hours per day, but
he worked a regular shift which ended at midnight.
On the day in question he stopped work at midnight
and thereafter left the station for his home. Several blocks from the police station he was struck by
a car. He was wearing a gun at the time. He fell
on his left side, and because of the fact that he was
wearing the gun on that side, he received internal
injuries. The court thought it clear that but for the
gun he would not have received such injuries. Said
the court:
''Moreover, we think the fair inference is
that Ward's injury to his left side, twhich appears to have done serious internal damage,
was the direct result of his having his pistol in
its scabbard in the position shown; that the
violent fall of this heavy man on this object
attached to his side was the cause of the injury.
It thus appears that his carrying of this
weapon, which his duty required, was the direct
cause of his injury; that the instrumentality
which proximately produced the injury was one
which he was required to use to perform his
duty. If this gun had been exploded by his fall
and wounded hi1n fatally, could it be contended
that his injury did not arise out of his employment?''
In Goins v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, (La.) 200
So. 481, the petitioner was a cab driver. Because
of occasional robberies and current strike troubles,
the employer supplied pistols to his employees. The
court noted :
''The drivers were not compelled to carry
revolvers, but the evidence leaves us satisfied
10
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that they were encouraged to have these
weapons for defense of themselves as well ns
the property of the defendant company."
The employee was waiting in his cab for a call
from passengers and while so waiting he and another employee began comparing guns. One of them
accidentally discharged and injured the petitioner.
The court held that the shooting arose out of the
employment and analyzed numerous shooting cases.
The court said :
"Ordinarily, plaintiff's employment as a cab
driver might not expose him to the danger of
accidental shooting any more than had he not
been so employed, but where the employer furnishes his employee with a revolver for the twofold purpose of protecting him and the property
of the employer from robberies, kidnappers
and possible trouble from striking drivers, he
is exposed to the danger of accidental shooting.
Necessarily, the employee would be called upon
to handle the pistol other than when actual
danger was present. As the court said in the
Brown case, we would be indulging in hairsplitting distinctions which would be without
foundation in law or fact, should we hold under
the facts of this case that the injury did not
arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment.''
In Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., (La.) 155
So. 63, petitioner was a traveling salesman. He carried valuables and to protect them he carried a gun.
The gun was his own gun. The employer knew that
the petitioner customarily carried the gun. While
stopped at a filling station the plaintiff picked up
the gun and while in the act of removing a shell from
it, accidentally shot himself in the foot. The employer contended that this did not arise out of the
employment. The court held that it did and said:
11
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"It cannot well be argued that in view of
the character of the plaintiff's duty, that of carrying in his car merchandise of considerable
value and cash and checks collected from customers, he was not necessarily exposed to greater
risks and damages from robbers and highwaymen, who, of late years ply their trade bodily
than he would be had he not been so employed.
This, as we understand the law is the true test."
The court went on to note that because the carrying of the gun was not unreasonable and that he was
injured by the gun "carried to prevent being robbed
and perhaps injured, it seems clear to us that the
case is compensable.''

Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, (Ala.) 32 So.
2nd 666. The deceased was employed as a night
watchman. He usually carried a .45 caliber gun of
his own, but the company had furnished a .32 caliber
pistol which was kept on the premises for use
by him or by other employees for protecting the
employer's property. The watchman was friendly
with a very young son of his supervisor. He took
the boy to his office to get a holster from the .32
caliber gun so that the boy could use it for his toy
gun. He took the .32 caliber gun from the holster
and placed the boy's toy gun in it. The boy picked
up the .32 caliber gun and shot and killed the watchman. The court said that the question in shooting
cases of this type is whether the accident ''arose
out of the employment.'' After reviewing several
cases the court said:
"In the instant case the employee's death
was caused by the accidental discharge of a
pistol which he used with the knowledge and
consent of the company officers in connection
with the performance of his duties. When guns
are handled, shooting accidents may be ex-

12
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pected. Such an accident is unquestionably a
hazard peculiar to the employment of a watchman or other person whose duties require the
use of firearms. The duties of his employment
subjected him to this hazard to which he would
not haYe been exposed apart from his employment. It is such a hazard as can be said to be
a natural consequence of the employment. A
firearm is a dangerous instrumentality * * * It
was by reason of his employment that the deceased was exposed to the danger incident to
the handling and carrying of pistols, and the
hazard of being shot by the accidental discharge
of the pistols was unquestionably a natural incident to his work.''
In Comstock v. Bivens, (Col.) 78 Col. 107, 239 P.
869, a mailman carrying mail for a company having
a contract on a star route was injured in a gun accident. He carried the gun because of the fact that
he had a route in sparsely populated areas. The
court said that while he was not required by his
employment to carry it, it was customary for mailmen in sparsely populated areas to carry a gun. He
had gone home for the night and was killed in front
of his home while removing the gun from the truck.
The court held that the accident arose out of his
employment.

McDaniel v. City of Benson, 167 Minn. 407, 209
N.W. 26. There the sole police officer of a city went
to his home to get a revolver. He placed the same
in a shoulder holster. He then stooped over for
some purpose and the gun discharged when it fell
to the floor. He died from the resulting injuries.
The court held that the accident arose out of his
employment.
Security State Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Col.
67, 59 P. 2nd 798. The deceased was assistant cashier
13
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of a bank. With the knowledge of the bank, he
carried a gun. He often brought deposits to the
bank from his home. The morning of the accident
he was carrying a bank deposit but stopped to mail
a letter. (Not in any way connected with the bank.)
The gun was discharged while he was stopped and
he died of the injuries thus sustained. The employer
claimed that he was neither in the course of his
employment, nor killed by accident arising out of
the employment. The court held that the mailing
of the letter was not a departure and then expressly
held that since he was carrying a gun with the
knowledge of his employer, even though no express
permission or instruction had been given him, the
carrying of the gun was connected with his employment and death from it arose out of his employment.

Gallaher v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (Texas) 77 S.W. 2d 312. An employee attended two oil
wells and lived on the premises of his employer near
one of them. He kept a gun for his own personal
use and also to protect the employer's property. He
was on call 24 hours per day. At the time of the
accident the gun was in his car at the place where
he lived. He was cleaning a tank for his employer.
The needed rags were in his car. While getting them
he caused the gun to discharge and was injured. The
court discussed at length the meaning of the phrase
"arising out of employment", and concluded that
the gun was connected with or incidental to the
employment, and that the accident for that reason
arose out of the employment. Said the court:
''The words 'out of' point to the origin and
cause of the accident or injury; the words 'in
the course of' to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident or injury takes
place. The character or quality of the accident
as conveyed by the words 'out of' involves the
idea that the accident is in some sense due to
14
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the employment. It must result from a risk
reasonably incident to the employment • • •.
"The rights of appellant depend upon the
reasonableness under all the circumstances of
his action in having the gun with him * * *.
"Gallaher was in the sense a watchman.
• • * X o orders had been issued preventing

him from carrying firearms and the evidence
indicates that the company rather expected him
to arm himself, if necessary, to protect the
property.''
The above cases cite many other similar cases.
Where the nature of the employment is such that the
employee might reasonably carry a gun, the courts are
uniform in holding that an injury from the gun arises
out of the employment. Since that is all that is necessary in Utah, the petitioner was entitled to an award.
Certainly, it was not unreasonable for Stroud to carry
a gun on his off-duty hours. There are at least four of
the cases cited above which expressly hold that it is not
necessary for the employer to order the employee to
carry a gun. It is sufficient if the employer knows that
the employee is carrying one and that the carrying of a
gun might reasonably further the employer's interests.
Here the employer both knew of the custom and encouraged it. (R. 9, 10, 20, 23, 25, 28)
We think in so far as the term ''arise out of the employment" is concerned, that it is immaterial that the
accident happened at the police station. Had Stroud
been killed at home by a gun kept by him for use in the
performance of his employment, the accident would have

15
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arisen out of the employment. In proving that an accident arises in the course of the employment, the time,
place and circumstances are important. But, an accident
may arise out of the employment, even though the employee is not at work and is not performing his employer's work. There are numerous cases which have sustained the proposition that an employee assaulted after
he has returned to his home at night from causes which
had their origin in his employment is injured from
causes arising out of his employment. See, for example,
the cases collected by Howitz on Workmen's Compensation, commencing on page 507, as cited with approval
by the Utah Supreme Court in the M. & K. Corporation
case, supra.

(b) The Industrial Commission's Opinion
The Industrial Commission went astray because it
focused its attention on the fact that Stroud was off
duty at the moment of the injury. The opinion of the
Industrial Commission emphasizes the fact that it was
Stroud's day off and that at the time of the accident he
was not performing an act connected with or incidental
to his duty. The Commission goes on to say that it is
generally agreed that if an employee on 24 hour call
has been called by his employer and is killed going to
or from work, his dependents are entitled to compensation. If applicant must found his case on a contention
that the injury occurred in the course of his employment,
all this would be of critical importance. But here the
primary contention of the applicant is that Stroud's
employment subjected him to dangers different frcm
16
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and greater than those of the public in general. His employment required him to have firearms available. (R.
23) He was exposed both on and off duty to the risks
of a gun accident. It was necessary for him to handle
firearms on his off-duty hours. (R. 25) Whenever he
went home he would be required to put his gun away
and to get it again when he left for work. In view of
the encouragement from Salt Lake City Police Department, it was not unreasonable for him to be carrying
the gun, even though off duty. Certainly, the keeping
of firearms was an incident of his employment and his
death resulted from a firearm kept by him to perform
the duties of his employment. This the Commission
does not consider nor discuss. The accident was directly
related to his employment and arose out of it.

(c) It is Immaterial That the Gwn Was Not Owned
By Salt Lake City.
At the hearing the city brought out the fact that
the gun which caused the death was not the gun regularly issued by Salt Lake City. (R. 12, 194) In Beaver
City v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 8, 245 P. 378,
the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that this was
immaterial. Other states have held to the same effect.
See for example, Frank v. Point Marion Bridge Co., 128
Pa. Sup. 269, 193 Atl. 421. There an employee was killed
by a borrowed .22 caliber rifle. The deceased had a company revolver, but was not using it. The court said that
the fact that it was a borrowed gun, rather than the one
the company had issued, was immaterial. See also Comstock v. Bevins, 78 Col. 107, 239 P. 869; Security State
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Bank of Sterling v. Propst, 99 Col 67, 59 P. 2nd 798, in
both of which the employee w~.s carrying his own gun
rather than one issued or furnished by the employer.
(d) It is Immaterial That the Employer Did Not Order
Stroud to Carry the Gun.
Many of the cases cited above expressly comment
on the fact that the injured employee was not ''required''
to carry the gun. These cases state that the employee
is allowed considerable latitude in selecting the means
by which he performs his employer's business. If the
carrying of a gun might reasonably promote the employer's business, that is sufficient. The following cases
comment upon the fact that the employer did not require
the carrying of a gun but merely acquiesced in it: Goins
v. Shreveport Yellow Cabs, 200 So. 481; Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., 155 So. 63; Comstock v. Bevins, 78
Col. 107, 239 P. 869; Security State Bank of Sterling v.
Propst, 99 Colo. 67, 59 P. 2nd 798; Gallaher v. U. S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 77 S.W. 2nd 312.
4. STROUD WAS IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
In arguing this point, we again emphasize the fact
that it is not necessary for the court to hold that Stroud
was both in the course of his employment and killed by
accident arising out of his employment. Either one will
suffice. We submit that in this instance both are present.
We feel that the Industrial Commission focused its attenwas in the course of his employment. Because it was his
tion solely upon the question of whether or not Stroud
18
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day off and because at the moment of the injury he was
not directly engaged in work which furthered the employer's interests, the Commission concluded that he was
not in the course of his employment. \Ve believe that
this was an immaterial departure from the business
which brought Stroud to the police station on the day
of the accident, and that he was in the course of his
employment. HoweYer, if the court should conclude that
this is not so, we nevertheless urge that he was killed
by accident arising out of his employment, which is all
that we are required to show.

The evidence is uncontradicted that Stroud was a
sergeant in charge of a group of police officers. He had
made an appointment with two officers to meet him at
the station at 6:00. (R. 15, 17, 18, 28) His intention was
to be at the station himself to check out for them a special
car. He was seen at his desk immediately before the
accident. (R. 29, 30) The evidence is uncontradicted that
he came to the station to check out this special car for
the two officers who were to meet him at 6:00 there. (R.
15, 17, 18, 28) Certainly he was in his employer's business
and at the station for that purpose While waiting for
these two officers to come in he went from the station
to lift soda water bottles from an officer's car to his
own car. (R. 11, 12, 13) Admittedly, this particular act
was not in furtherance of the employer's business. ( R.
11, 12, 13) He was, however, at the station to perform
the employer's business and this is in our opinion the
important factor. (R. 15, 17, 18, 28) While at the station
to perform the employer's business, he certainly could
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move about the station for personal matters without
leaving the course of his employment. Had he completed
the business of checking out the special car and then
become engaged in arrangements for the policeman's
party, we think he would have left the course of his employment. However, he had not completed the task
which brought him to the station. (R. 15) He was waiting
for the officers who were late coming in for the agreed
a~pointment. (R. 15) It seems to us highly unreasonable
to restrict his activity at the station to matters which
furthered the employer's business, so that any departure like washing his hands, combing his hair, or engaging in social conversation carries him out of his
employment. The Utah Court has never in the past
adhered to such narrow rules insofar as departure from
employment is concerned. We emphasize the fact that
he was at the station to further the employer's business
and had not completed his work in that regard. (R. 15,
17, 18, 28) We think that this placed him in the course
of his employment and that the excursion to the patrol
car to get the soda water was not a departure. The
important cases on departure are Twin Peaks Ca;n;ning
Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 589, 196 P.
853; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah
581, 137 P. 2nd 364; and IYI. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488. See also Smith v. University of Idaho, 170 P. 2nd 404; Dunphy v. Augustia
College of Villanova, 195 Atl. 782; Sweat v. Allen, 200
So. 348; Sta.te Road Commission v. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 252.
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SU 1\ll\IARY

\Ye base our case primarily on the contention that
Stroud was killed by accident arising "out of" his employment. He was killed by a gun carried because he
was employed as a policeman. He was encouraged by
his employer to carry a gun even while off duty. ~
he was going to the police station to check out a car
clearly an act for his employer's benefit, and while going
to the station to do that work be did not act unreasonably
in carrying his gun. The accident had its origin and
cause in his employment and it, therefore, ''arose out
of'' it, even if he had departed from his employment and
hence was not "in the course of" his employment.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE,
Attorney for Petitioner.
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